Having these documents add to the story in a meaningful way through. It very much gives context to the Cuban crisis as the USSRs only decent tools appear to have been shorter range than what the US had. The US could be just as threatening to the USSR without leaving home when it took the USSR setting up in Cuba to counter the threat. This certainly gives context to me and make the USSR look less the aggressor and actually weak, forced into a corner.
For a fascinating, fictional, but well researched look into what the Cuban crisis could have turned into if it had gone hot, check out the Cuban Missile War:
Well, the USSR's problem was two-fold: until Cuba they didn't have a place to put their short- and medium-ranged ballistic missiles. They did have ICBMs that could hit the US, but 1) there would be enough warning for an immediate counter strike and 2) they just couldn't deliver enough to cripple the US. The Soviet Union's concern was also that the US did have missiles in places like Turkey and Germany, which provided them decent first strike ability that-- until Cuba-- the Soviets didn't have.
To my mind, though, the big differentiater was Strategic Air Command. The US had an enormous amount of bombers regularly patrolling outside of Soviet airspace. Had SAC been ordered in there would have been plenty of warning, but it provided massive second strike capability. The Soviet Union had no answer for that and never would, which is why they did opt to go heavy on the ICBMs whereas the US spread out its weaponry across the nuclear triad.
