There are states and leaders that the entire world wants gone. Saddam was one of them. Kim Jong Il is another. The problem is that the world fails to realize solving political bankruptcy is just as important as solving financial bankruptcy.

Thomas Barnett is the man to listen to on this stuff: http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_.... Your view is a common misconception that should be corrected.

How so? You state this concretely as though it's a fact, but you don't go on to support it with any evidence at all. I asserted that it would be simpler due to the relative resources of the hostile forces in the countries, and I still stand by that assertion.

I would also cite the article that started this thread; as it said, murdering a single violent leader in these areas of Africa seems to do a pretty good job of taking the wind out of the "rebels'" sails. (I'm using the term "rebel" there somewhat loosely; they really aren't rebelling against anything other than peace.)

Whereas in Iraq, the murder of a single violent leader has caused a bloody and violent civil war and furthered racial tensions. Also, this was predictable: I researched the situation in Iraq before our tanks even rolled into the country, years ago, and came to the conclusion that our usual tactics there would cause this sort of conflict. It's hard for me to imagine that actual scholars wouldn't have been able to do a better job of predicting the outcome there.

And, the whole point of an armed incursion would be to dispel the current political climate (or lack thereof) and create a new, more peaceful, social climate.

> I'm willing to assert strongly that a mission to an African nation would be far harder.

Then do so! :-)

> There are states and leaders that the entire world wants gone. Saddam was one of them.

I question your sense of "the entire world" then. As I recall, there was quite a lot of protest around the world over the U.S. actions in Iraq.

As I said, the invasion is the trivial part, but you keep focusing on it. I did provide proof by the way. My proof is in the video. Please watch it. Thomas Barnett's whole point is that your way of thinking is outdated. The invasion doesn't matter. There isn't any country the US can't invade. Barnett knows a helluva lot more than you or I and I think you should listen and consider what he's saying.

I question your sense of "the entire world" then. As I recall, there was quite a lot of protest around the world over the U.S. actions in Iraq.

That has nothing to do whether the world wanted Saddam gone or not. In general, it's safe to assume that (if given the option) the world would like to take mass murders out of power. Disagreeing with the means does not imply disagreeing with the ends in any logic system I know of.

EDIT:

And, the whole point of an armed incursion would be to dispel the current political climate (or lack thereof) and create a new, more peaceful, social climate.

This is exactly right, but Barnett's point is that we don't know how to do that. That's why a mission to Africa is harder; there's less of a foundation to build on in Africa than in Iraq. The fact that we're able to build an Iraqi army and police force of any size is impressive. At the moment such a task would be impossible in Africa. Think about Iraq pre-invasion. They had a uniformed army, police, and some semblance of government. These things do not exist in many African nations.

But, I just finished watching it. It's great! I was disappointed at the audience's awkward laughter to points that I don't think he was joking about, but he makes a very compelling point, and he makes it clearly.

That said, I don't disagree with him or you on this, and I wasn't actually just focusing on the initial invasion, though I can see how my statements could be interpreted that way.

I'll try to do a better job this time:

I think some parts of Africa, like Sudan, would be easier to both develop an initial presence in, and maintain a mostly peaceful presence in, than Iraq. Although you're right to point out that Iraq has more social infrastructure to begin with, that social infrastructure provides resources to "the other side" as well as "our side".

In other words, I think that there being less of a foundation to build on in Africa is actually beneficial -- even after considering Barnett's point, and agreeing with it. I think it's beneficial because it allows us to more easily provide resources to impoverished people without having to fight them for it. Think about it: there are no schools to blow up in some of these areas, so we can build them from scratch and introduce education to a population that hasn't had it.

I [EDIT: don't] think it's right to say "we don't know how to do that"; though Barnett may say the same thing, I think it's more of a statement that "we don't do that". Certainly Barnett has some good ideas about doing that, as do some aspects of the U.N. and organizations like the Peace Corps.

To underline my point: Iraq did indeed have a uniformed army, police, and some government -- and it is the remnants of those things which we are still fighting in that country to this day, and that's why Africa would be easier to administrate.

I seem to recall something about weapons of mass destruction as the main reason going around when we invaded Iraq. Did I just hallucinate that whole thing? Because the human rights thing sounds like a huge retcon.

WMD were indeed the initial justification; however, when various U.N. investigations failed to find much in the way of evidence for WMD development -- other than a possible mobile chemical lab which may or may not have been used for WMD development IIRC -- the WMD justification came under heavy criticism by those who were following the progress.

The WMD reasoning in fact came under international criticism before we officially breached the Iraqi border. I distinctly recall this because this situation was what prompted my research and essay at the time. The U.S. had mounted large forces on Iraq borders and other points in the area, and I guessed that there was no way the U.S. administration would then simply recall of those forces. They were there, so they had to do something.

So, to counter the weakening of the WMD case, the case for human rights protection started making the rounds in mainstream media and talk radio. Suddenly the case wasn't that Saddam might be able to harm the U.S., it was that Saddam was a bad guy and we were going in there to do good things for the population that he was oppressing.

And that worked long enough to roll the troops in, destroy some cities, topple a statue, and find the guy hiding in a hole.

Also, Saddam did at one point have WMDs, he used chemical weapons to kill over 5000 Kurds.

In neither case was the peacekeeping mission itself particularly successful. MONUC in the DRC stood impressive but ineffectual for over a decade as the violence continued raging around them and civilians continued dying and being terrorised. The violence has arguably died down only because President Kabila has proven to be fairly tenacious and the government army has managed to restore some level control in certain areas, thanks in part to training by Belgian and South African military advisors. UNAMID in Sudan did not seem to achieve much, though their reporting was valuable, with much of the progress in that country seemingly being due to the ongoing strengthening of the South Sudanese rebel movements and the severe international pressure that worked for once. In retrospect, we may be able to claim that both missions were ultimately successful, but it's clear that if it's a rapid end to violence and an improvement in basic human security you want then look elsewhere.

These conflicts are usually just too much of an intractable problem for peacekeeping to be of any real effect. For one, peacekeeping by its very nature tends to preserve the status quo, by slowing the conflict down and preventing either side from gaining a swift advantage, but this is what allows these conflicts to drag on for decades without any real winner. For another, peacekeeping forces are seldom capable of performing offensive missions to wipe out rebel forces and their leaders or groups of bandits, not only because they're not funded for it but because that would require deciding from the outset who to support and who to destroy and the UN, in order not to adversely effect possible negotiations, usually tries to avoid that. After all, what if you make the wrong choice? Finally, how do you build a state up without any kind of central authority around which to hang the authority, monopoly of force and institutions needed to ensure human security? This by the way was a large part of the problem in Iraq, where the US had to create a central authority from scratch and found it to be a whole lot harder than initially thought.

If you are willing to make a snap judgement about who is 'good or bad' in a conflict though, there are solutions that will result in short-term stabilisation. One of these is the use of mercenaries, who have proven in the past (see Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and their proposed intervention plan for Rwanda) to be effective in this sort of scenario. However, the use of mercenaries is undoubtedly subject to abuses and it's a short-term solution in most cases, as the core civil and social dysfunction that permitted the breakdown in order in the first place remains present. However, they also only work best in cases where they're able to piggy-back off some sort of central authority and where they have a clear mandate and a clear distinction of who the good and bad guys are. And when they leave, as when Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone to be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force, the violence can start up all over again.

In the end I think the sad fact of the matter is that this is not a simple problem to solve, despite surface impressions. Conflict, crime, poverty and sexual abuse in many African countries is all part of the same issue, of states and civil institutions that are either totally dysfunctional or entirely non-existent, a concurrent tendency for regions to produce warlords rather than self-sufficient federalist enclaves and the immense difficulty both the people living in the country and those from outside face in trying to build a viable and secure system of governance in a place that has little or nothing on which to build. So unfortunately, I think we're going to be living with this problem for a long time to come.