This is super important research, due to what the article calls, "low security threshold and high passenger count".
I wish the research results would be given to the public, though I understand why we won't see the results for some time, or possibly never.
It's also kind of scary that their only listed "remediation" is to have more accurate contamination maps. It really hits home the concept that, once a bad guy actually gets a weapon to a crowd, there's not much more that can be done.
Part of the idea behind "more accurate contamination maps" is to mobilize the appropriate response -- personnel, drugs, and so on. So it isn't just about knowing where to clean up (although it involves that, too).
These sorts of tests also aim at helping guide the first response. For a long time, there was an ongoing debate about the proper response to an attack on a subway (it's probably still going on, but I haven't talked with this crowd in a few years). For example, suppose a CCTV spots a bunch of passengers going down in a particular terminal. Should you shut down the ventilation system, in order to try to contain the material? Or should you crank up the system, in order to dilute the hazardous material? How should those decisions change depending on the type of material, the amount released, the atmospheric conditions, and the timing of the response? Should you stop all trains in the tunnels, or should you run them to the nearest station for evacuation? All of this requires estimating potential health impacts, to those on the platform, in the rest of the system, and downwind of the affected stations.
> ...there was an ongoing debate about the proper response...
I don't know about subway specifics, but the matter was settled a long time ago for buildings - and it didn't take long to arrive at the conclusion. Containment is the policy. The first thing that happens when any toxic substance is suspected, in a security conscious facility, is the shutdown of HVAC followed by the restriction of uncontrolled movement (elevators sent home, security posted in stairwell, etc). Even in areas equipped with filtration systems (like mail rooms). I've never heard anyone suggest dilution, you'd have to have NBC sensors that can instantly detect every toxic substance in order to avoid unknowingly spreading anthrax piggybacked on an irritant like CS. Such sensors do not exist.
Therefore, the best offense is reducing the chances that such bad guys crop up in the first place by diplomacy, peace, foreign aid, and just friendly relations with our neighbors.
This might not seem like the place and time to preach peace, but now is as good a time as any.
I wish the research results would be given to the public, though I understand why we won't see the results for some time, or possibly never.
It's also kind of scary that their only listed "remediation" is to have more accurate contamination maps. It really hits home the concept that, once a bad guy actually gets a weapon to a crowd, there's not much more that can be done.