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Got it to 0.5991561181434598 after a while (totally random would be "0.5").

Not sure how "free will" comes into play, if there was indeed free will, I could have freely decided to only press one, and the Oracle would have had close to 100% certainty.

Rather, what it measures is randomness or predictability, which is not the same thing as free will (especially "after the fact", e.g. after the choice is made).




Right. It tries to measure how random your brain's PRNG is, which has nothing to do with free will. A simple computer has no free will at all, but after being instructed to type randomly, it will score close to 0.5 without fail.

The "free will" quote comes from a Berkley quantum computing student, who chose keys as independently of pattern as he could [1], and this seems to take it out of context. It might make sense to retitle this submission to something marginally less clickbaity, like "test how predictable you are."

[1] https://github.com/elsehow/aaronson-oracle


To most people, "how predictable you are" and "whether you have free will" are almost the same question.


Well, those people are wrong I'd say.

Being quite unpredictable just means that you do a lot of random things -- but says nothing about how you came to will them.

If someone, for example, was threatened and ordered to follow for years what a program with millions of suggestions told him to do, he would be very unpredictable, but totally without free will.

And the inverse: one could choose to do the same routine all his life, and thus be very predictable, but it would still be his free choice.


Fair enough, but was only speaking to the "clickbait" charge, by arguing that it's not misleading to characterize this as test of "free will" in the typical usage of the term.

But yeah, it's not the same as being unpredictable: that would look like seizures, not "gosh which ice cream flavor will he pick?:


Those people are wrong. Other commenters dealt with that below.

RE free will itself, I'm thinking it has more to do with metacognition and general complexity of thoughts. People may have free will, but they're running the same "free will algorithm" - give them the same inputs, and most of the time you'll get the same outputs. A lot of people don't want to consciously accept that, but it's a fact. It's e.g. why economics works at all - because people are predictable at scale.

But when do we most often reference the concept of "free will" in practice? In evaluating degree of responsibility for decisions. "You did X, which was the most obvious and beneficial in the short-term option, but you could've done Y or Z, which would be better - therefore you will suffer consequences". Or, "I won't do X even though the situation tries to manipulate me into doing it; I notice I'm being manipulated so I'll do Y instead". Scenarios like these refer to the human ability of a) non-greedy optimization (long-term planning), and b) being able to go meta many levels up, to notice their own patterns of thoughts and use them as an input to the thinking process. A feedback loop over metacognition if you don't mind.

This is still all pretty deterministic. The apparent randomness - I think - comes from the fact that a) two people never have perfectly the same set of inputs, because the internal state is dependent on one's life history, and b) in some cases slight variations in those inputs cause huge variations in outputs (butterfly/hurricane and all that). In a way, the main connection between "free will" and randomness may be just that a human doesn't have capability to perfectly predict the thought process of another human. We can do that to inanimate objects, we can do that to algorithms we write - at least in principle. But we know that other humans will always suprise us (at least because they can notice we're trying to predict them and start acting random to mess with us).


> "give them the same inputs, and most of the time you'll get the same outputs.... people are predictable at scale."

That's not quite how economics work. It's more like, outputs from a given set of inputs can be characterized in a statistical way at scale (which is subtly different from saying that individuals are predictable at scale.) It's not that every person will choose to buy pizza if it's $11.99 but not if it's $12.00, but instead that if you offer pizza for $11.99 you'll generally get between X and Y sales per day, and if you increase that to $12.00 you can expect to lose about Z sales, and you can mess with that curve to try to maximize revenues or whatever.

I would say that what makes "free will" an interesting concept is that it's about how one chooses to prioritize different values -- how they express meaning by their choices. In the sense of a "free will algorithm", it's how you choose to weight different factors in your algorithm. How do you weight comfort, pleasure, stimulation, challenge, avoidance of pain, etc.? How do you weight those things for others? In practical usage, we talk about "free will" when someone makes a choice that surprises us, showing that their value system or their evaluation matrix is different from ours.


If I had to guess? I'd say most people believe they are capable of choosing their actions - but they would also admit to a reasonably predictable set of habits.


Yes, I think most people don't bring predictability into it at all. Free will is about the feeling of "I could do, or could have done, X instead of Y", but your search space only ever included X, Y, and Z. Just knowing your search space makes you highly predictable even if you maintain the freedom to choose inside that space. (And however we choose, it is not randomly, that would be terrible, but more chaotic in the same sense that weather has too many unknown inputs that we can't predict all the details we want to perfectly.)


Whether or not determinism and free will are compatible is a very intricate debate that your throwaway remark doesn't do justice to. Look up Compatibilism.


Also, Determinism (philosophy) != deterministic (computing)

The former is the metaphysical idea that all events are causally linked, a belief which we can never confirm or refute. The latter describes something's observable degree of predictability.

They're not related concepts at all. This demo has nothing to do with free will, Determinism, or Compatibilism - but it's an interesting study in predictability.


Is the distinction roughly "causally determined" vs "logically determined" ?

If we are talking about an abstract computing device, and whether it is deterministic, we mean whether its next state is always uniquely logically determined by the current state, correct?

Hmm, if an abstract machine behaves in a way that is uniquely logically determined, but which is not computable, do we consider such machines to be deterministic? I would think so, but I am not sure. We would be unable to predict it, does that make it not deterministic(computing) ?


Again, I was only speaking to the issue of whether it's misleading/clickbait to the average person, not whether they're really equal.


Scott Aaronson has a cool paper taking about the relationship between the two questions.

Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0159


Did they predict that I'd wire the {d,f} input to a PRNG? Did they predict that I have a lot of digits of pi memorized, or that I could use the hex 'spigot' formula to generate digits of pi, then convert d=0, f=1 (or the inverse)?

Did they predict which method I'd wire it up with and the exact source of the program I'd use to do so?

I'm going to hazard a 'no', so it looks like I have free will.


You had free will anyway. More to the point, you used it to behave unpredictably.


The only way to assume that those are synonymous would be to ask if one can freely will themselves to be random. However, even that has more to do with aptitude and ability than free will. E.g. I can freely will myself to try and be an NBA player, but I'm bound by physical limitations. However, my inability to be an NBA player would not normally be considered a lacking of free will.


The "free will" bit is more of a joke than anything, based on a quote from Scot Aaronson's book (explained in the GitHub Readme):

> I couldn’t even beat my own program, knowing exactly how it worked. I challenged people to try this and the program was getting between 70% and 80% prediction rates. Then, we found one student that the program predicted exactly 50% of the time. We asked him what his secret was and he responded that he “just used his free will.”


There's another Aaronson call-back: he's complained about how trivial results (like the core part of the Free Will Theorem) will get a lot more attention if you mention free will:

> I wrote a review of Steven Wolfram's book a while ago where I mentioned this, as a basic consequence of Bell's Theorem that ruled out the sort of deterministic model of physics that Wolfram was trying to construct. I didn't call my little result the Free Will Theorem, but now I've learned my lesson: if I want people to pay attention, I should be talking about free will!

http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec18.html


if .5 is completely random, what does it mean that I got it down to 0.4781666666666667? I may have gotten it lower than that, but got tired of taking screenshots. Eventually I ended up back around .53


It means you were able to fake the algorithm out. Consider a very simple algorithm that guesses based on your previous two characters:

  df  d
  dd  d
  fd  f
  ff  f
This is presumably much simpler than what the page is doing, but will nonetheless work pretty well on humans by looking for alternations and long runs.

This algorithm is trivially defeated (chance of guessing 0) by the string

ffddffddffdd

Since that holds a pattern just long enough to get the algorithm to guess based on it and then switches.

For a little while, either intentionally or not, you must have been doing a more sophisticated version of this.

With perfect knowledge, it should be possible to get it down to 0.


if .5 is completely random, what does it mean that I got it down to 0.4781666666666667?...Eventually I ended up back around .53

It means you were temporarily a statistical outlier.


Any random result series has such "unlikely" occurrences -- you can get 100 6 in a row by throwing dice for example, it's just rare. It's the long term convergence that matters.


I think I might have missed the point of this. Is this just a predictability score - really simple one?


Yeah, I feel like randomness and "free will"-ness are pretty orthogonal. That said, I was able to keep the thing below a maximum of .56-ish without using any of the tricks others have suggested here, like picking an insignificant digit in the accuracy number and pressing 'f' or 'd' based on its value, or using the even/oddness of successive positions in π, or whatever.

So, apparently, my brain's PRNG is pretty random. But I still have absolutely fuck-all idea whether or not I have "free will".

Fun two-and-small-change minutes, though.


I got mine to hover around 58%. I was watching which sequences it was predicting and then changing them. That seems to mostly work.


This is silly. Enough people (especially self-reporting), a large percentage will be well below 50% (unless it really is an oracle). About as soon as I started, it quickly dropped into the 30's. Even after several minutes and hundreds or thousands of keystrokes, it hardly moved over 50%.


I got mine down to 0.31xxx. I did about a hundred strokes and it never went over 0.48.


Quickly got it down to 0.500001 or something, but now back to 0.54 :-(


I can consistently get 60% by drumming the keys with both index fingers, not consciously picking the values but still generating them myself.


I was at 53% after about 20 presses, and then by trying hard got it down to 47%.

Don't ask me what 'trying hard' means -- I don't know! :-)




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