> there are good reasons why intent plays such a large role in our conception of justice.
Actually, the reason that we consider intent is that we think that intent has some bearing on outcome. The argument is "but for {unexpected}, the outcome would have been good".
However, if {unexpected} is not actually unexpected, that argument does not apply.
> I'm wary about assigning excess blame to people responding to the incentives placed in front of them, even under ideal conditions.
In what universe is it "excess" to blame someone for the expected outcome of their actions?
They got some benefit for cooperating with evil - why is it wrong to blame them for that?
Actually, the reason that we consider intent is that we think that intent has some bearing on outcome. The argument is "but for {unexpected}, the outcome would have been good".
However, if {unexpected} is not actually unexpected, that argument does not apply.
> I'm wary about assigning excess blame to people responding to the incentives placed in front of them, even under ideal conditions.
In what universe is it "excess" to blame someone for the expected outcome of their actions?
They got some benefit for cooperating with evil - why is it wrong to blame them for that?