Borda is better than Plurality and IRV regardless of the amount of tactical voters.

http://ScoreVoting.net/BayRegsFig.html

Interesting. I'd have to look at that simulation.

What about cloning candidates? The simulation only looks at strategic voting.

The simulation uses random utility generators, which sometimes create situations where two candidates are highly similar and thus "partially" clones. The point is to model reality.

Compliance with "independence of clones" is in this property chart. http://scorevoting.net/CompChart.html

I get where you are coming from on Approval Voting. The simplicity of the system is very attractive.

Other systems might be slightly better. But Approval Voting is dead simple to explain, and you don't even need new ballot papers compared to plurality.

The only system that's generally better is Score Voting aka Range Voting. But you want to _avoid_ ranked voting methods.

http://ScoreVoting.net/NESD.html

I don't think the argument presented there works.

Consider the example with A, B, and C at the end. It claims that approval voting would probably elect C, but why? If the voters apply perfect strategy, B supporters won't approve C, and B will win. The same is true of range voting, where B supporters will give C a rating of zero.

It does not seem escapable that a majority voter block can dictate their wishes on the whole population by exaggerating their stated preferences.

As long as you need a majority, that's still very democratic? (If it was a plurality only, that would be harder.)

Yes, but the page in question is arguing that approval/rank voting is better because it doesn't always elect the majority's first choice.

I'm pretty convinced that for single winner elections approval voting is pretty great.

I haven't convinced myself when multiple people can get elected.