Engineers refusing to do the work might be counter-productive. It'd allow the FBI and its supporters to change the narrative to one potentially more favorable to them. Instead of a debate about encryption and privacy, they'd try to change it to a debate about respecting the courts that plays right into the "law and order" mindset. I don't know how it'd play out, but I'd hate to give the government yet another advantage, however slim it might be.
That said, there's probably one benefit to being forced to do the work: the engineers involved will be extremely motivated to stick it to the government by designing systems that can't be circumvented like this again. "Too bad, so sad - we can't do that any more. We're very, very sorry for the inconvenience."
> by designing systems that can't be circumvented like this again. "Too bad, so sad - we can't do that any more. We're very, very sorry for the inconvenience."
But that's exactly why this case is so, so critical. FBI is fishing for a precedent that will make designing these types of systems explicitly illegal. Apple is well aware of this strategy, which is why they've chosen to take their stand here, as unpleasant as the PR ramifications may be.
That's actually a separate, but related, issue. Right now, the courts are weighing whether the FBI can force the creation of a modified OS largely because (a) it's possible to do so with how existing iPhones are engineered, and (b) it wouldn't drastically inconvenience Apple to do so in light of their resources. If they get a favorable ruling, they have a precedent they'll try and use to gain access to other phones in their possession. But that really only applies to phones where it's possible to do so right now. If they can't do the same for future phones, the precedent is moot.
The court isn't ruling on whether Apple has the right to modify their systems to prevent this strategy in the future. No matter how the court decides, it won't affect how Apple can design future devices. If the FBI were to ask for a ruling like that, they'd either lose or it'd be overturned on appeal. Something like that, where the government is actively telling manufacturers how they can and cannot design their products, could really only come from a new law instead of trying to backdoor it through the courts.
I don't doubt that the government would love a tool like that, but it'd be aggressively challenged as an unprecedented expansion of federal power if it was ever signed into law. And that's iffy; a law like that would jeopardize overseas sales for tech companies even more than the NSA's actions already have. They'd have no choice but to pour an incredible sum of money into lobbying efforts, major PR campaigns, and campaign donations to fight it politically and hit back hard against any politicians who supported such a law.
No worries. But I do think you're right, that sort of situation would absolutely be a long-term dream for the government. When companies take steps to further lock down their devices, there's probably a pretty decent chance that someone is going to get a very not-so-bright idea and try to run with it.
I don't think it'd succeed for the reasons above, but when the alternative is nothing, dumb ideas can look awfully good to people at first. If there's one thing that's come out of all the publicity over the FBI's request, it's that every criminal and terrorist in the world now knows to turn off their iCloud backups. It was obvious before, but never so publicized. Oops? Unintended consequences.
That said, there's probably one benefit to being forced to do the work: the engineers involved will be extremely motivated to stick it to the government by designing systems that can't be circumvented like this again. "Too bad, so sad - we can't do that any more. We're very, very sorry for the inconvenience."