The question is not whether or not it is possible (in the sense that it is useful) but whether it leads to knowledge. This, of course, depends on your definition of knowledge, which is the question of epistemology. In some circles these days there is a move back to a utilitarian definition of knowledge, namely, if you can interact with a system and predict its behavior then you can say you know how it works, because your model is useful. This is not, however, the commonly accepted view of what constitutes knowledge.
Funny thing: the consequence of the Gettier problem (sort of like the "incompleteness conjecture" of epistemology) is that either we must accept a very unsatisfying definition to what constitutes knowledge, or use a good, rigorous and satisfying definition and then find out that nothing we think we know actually qualifies.
The question is not whether or not it is possible (in the sense that it is useful) but whether it leads to knowledge. This, of course, depends on your definition of knowledge, which is the question of epistemology. In some circles these days there is a move back to a utilitarian definition of knowledge, namely, if you can interact with a system and predict its behavior then you can say you know how it works, because your model is useful. This is not, however, the commonly accepted view of what constitutes knowledge.
Funny thing: the consequence of the Gettier problem (sort of like the "incompleteness conjecture" of epistemology) is that either we must accept a very unsatisfying definition to what constitutes knowledge, or use a good, rigorous and satisfying definition and then find out that nothing we think we know actually qualifies.