I'd love to see what a detailed version of security policies and infrastructure look like in a world of backdoor-less strong encryption from Schneier, the EFF, the Hopkins crew, etc. Something that can be used to persuade, or at least influence policymakers by allowing them to see that another way is possible, one that allows security services to do their job in a way that allows them to feel that their work isn't futile, while simultaneously respecting privacy rights.
I think the need for strong encryption and no backdoors (which has Schneier explains, are always a double-edged sword) are very important and I support them, but that those on the side of it who also have in-depth knowledge about the finer details don't deign to articulate just what exactly the policy looks like without resorting to just a list of what we shouldn't do and vague allusions to "just go old-school" or "utilize human assets more."
A coherently articulated, normative counterfactual security platform would be a better place to argue from.
It's a cousin to the negative liberty arguments: they only list what not to do to in order to avoid hurting people, rather than what we can do to help them (positive liberty.)
Maybe we could frame the question as "If we let the EFF and Bruce Schneier redesign the United States security apparatus from scratch, what would it look like?"
I see where you're coming from, but at the same time, one does not need to formulate an alternate strategy to point out that the emperor has no clothes.
Strong encryption cannot be back doored in an effective way, this is just a fact. Ignoring that fact because we wish it were otherwise, or asking the people that point out that fact what we're supposed to do in light of that fact, doesn't change that fact.
The group constantly pushing for backdoored strong encryption fails to realise that they are asking for regulations to ensure that all water is only ever sold in ice form. This does not, and cannot, mean that all water will only be available as ice. This needs to be realised, accepted and moved on from.
Only then we can start actually trying to formulate a coherent asymmetric warfare strategy, cognisant of the actual facts on the ground rather than wishful thinking and ignorance.
I agree that we don't need to formulate a strategy to criticize. What I'm saying is that we're already fantastically good at that, and have articulated the negatives very well; I just don't think we've presented a credible, compelling vision that will get those in power to say "Ok, there's an alternative that might work. Let's try that instead of going down this other road that is only making people angry and/or probably won't have the desired outcomes anyway."
I think the need for strong encryption and no backdoors (which has Schneier explains, are always a double-edged sword) are very important and I support them, but that those on the side of it who also have in-depth knowledge about the finer details don't deign to articulate just what exactly the policy looks like without resorting to just a list of what we shouldn't do and vague allusions to "just go old-school" or "utilize human assets more."
A coherently articulated, normative counterfactual security platform would be a better place to argue from.
It's a cousin to the negative liberty arguments: they only list what not to do to in order to avoid hurting people, rather than what we can do to help them (positive liberty.)
Maybe we could frame the question as "If we let the EFF and Bruce Schneier redesign the United States security apparatus from scratch, what would it look like?"