You've missed the 2nd half of my post I see, I said that if any even half arsed measures are going to be in place the crackdown will become more effective with time.
If you can stall or slow down the evolution of open encryption sufficiently so state actors can catch up then that's effectively makes that encryption useless.
Today for example the NSA can break weak DSA configurations, and factor weak RSA keys in 2-3 years they'll gain other capabilities.
What will happen if say we do wake up to a post quantum world with much of our asymmetric cryptography being worthless.
Do you really see people being able to develop a new RSA level family of algorithms at a hackaton?
If you can't increase the work that needed to be done to break your encryption at the same rate as your adversary increases their capabilities you are going to lose and lose badly.
And draconian measures and extreme costs is just what they are proposing, I'm not advocating that it's going to be effective at first or cheap, but dismissing it as even if they want too they will never be able too is just as foolish as voting for Trump ironically to give him a sympathy vote.
Go ask people from East Germany, pre-Glasnost Russia and even some countries that exist today how easy it is going to be to evade surveillance enmass.
You should never be dismissive of threats no matter how far fetched or unlikely they are or how incapable your opponent at executing them might be, this is probably one of the more important lessons one can take from history.
There are a variety of algorithms which are safe in a post-quantum crypto world. Developing and deploying them will take time, but they exist. Making them safe will take longer, but it will happen.
The threat you describe sounds like a race. But in fact, it's more like a switch. Right now the world is pre-quantum. When the switch is flipped, to post-quantum, a lot of algorithms will break. But not all of them.
Regarding your point, I don't think that people here are being dismissive of your ideas. You're quite right. But there are reasons to be positive about the future, while highlighting the negatives. Isn't it so interesting that certain algorithms can be safe in a pqcrypto world?
Notice where the algorithms spring up from. You mention a hackathon, but that's not where these algorithms root. They're from universities. And universities are interesting. If the legislation will face resistance, it will probably be from academics, like in the last crypto war.
Today there won't be much issues, I'm talking about a reality in which your Government (doesn't matter if it's the US, UK, Germany or China) is not only not helping you to build strong crypto (which they always done so in the past), but actually is working against you.
How easy would it to work on open encryption software if we'll have to revert to the Pre Bernstein V. United States era (which wasn't so long ago) and one that might actually be more heavily regulated than (restriction on actual work on encryption and related field rather than exporting software) before? Heck Phil Zimmermann almost ended up going to jail when PGP was "leaked" outside of the US, and this isn't East Germany, this is the US in the mid 90's.
And I'm saying, yes, you're right. But have hope. That's something to watch out for going forward, but we can go forward.
This thread's article is interesting, because it's the first step toward a world you describe. But reason has a way of prevailing. Not always, but usually.
One thing that's missing now, that someone here might want to cook up, is a good explanation. The topic of crypto is difficult. Not just because it's hard like calculus, but because there are a lot of subtleties. Old analogies to locks and doors aren't really applicable. What we need is a way of highlighting what's going on, why people should care, and what they can do.
What will happen if say we do wake up to a post quantum world with much of our asymmetric cryptography being worthless. Do you really see people being able to develop a new RSA level family of algorithms at a hackaton?
If you can't increase the work that needed to be done to break your encryption at the same rate as your adversary increases their capabilities you are going to lose and lose badly.
And draconian measures and extreme costs is just what they are proposing, I'm not advocating that it's going to be effective at first or cheap, but dismissing it as even if they want too they will never be able too is just as foolish as voting for Trump ironically to give him a sympathy vote.
Go ask people from East Germany, pre-Glasnost Russia and even some countries that exist today how easy it is going to be to evade surveillance enmass.
You should never be dismissive of threats no matter how far fetched or unlikely they are or how incapable your opponent at executing them might be, this is probably one of the more important lessons one can take from history.