Maybe it continues the historical tradition of Federalists vs Anti-Federalists:
"The primary opposition to the Constitution was based on it being a centralizing document that risked making the states a mere administrative arm of the central government.
States' rights advocates like Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, Patrick Henry, and Elbridge Gerry were wary of the new document.
The Federalists were aware of these objections and their opponents.
Thus, in trying to head them off at the pass, they adopted the name Federalists to give people the impression, true or not, that they were for a federal form of government and not a national one.
This forced those who opposed the constitution to be known as Anti-Federalists, which to the less attentive audience gave the impression that they were against federalism and thus for a centralized regime."
> If it is recognized that Facebook is a media company, it will be legally liable for its content, and it will be forced to keep better track of fraudulent anonymous usage, like U.S. political ads placed by foreign customers.
What is exactly fraudulent about U.S. political ads placed by foreign customers?
The weirder part of this statement is that they count "political ads [being] placed by foreign customers" as "anonymous usage". If it's anonymous, how do they know they were foreign?
"What sorts of decisions does he [sponsor] make?
According to some network executives, he no longer makes decisions that deal with programming.
Spokesmen for sponsoring organizations tend toward similar statements, but with a difference.
They say they don't want to control programming, but insist on the right to decide with what programs their names or commercials will be associated.
They leave it to broadcasting companies to provide suitable settings for this participation.
The broadcasters do so.
Perhaps they are all saying that sponsorship has become so essential, so crucial to the whole scheme of things, that interference of the old sort is no longer necessary.
A vast industry has grown up around the needs and wishes of sponsors.
Its program formulas, business practices, ratings, demographic surveys have all evolved in ways to satisfy sponsor requirements.
He has reached the ultimate status: most decision-making swirls at levels below him, requiring only his occasional benediction at this or that selected point.
He is potentate of our time."
Quote from Conclusions chapter of Manufacturing Consent (from edition published in 2002, but I don't think this part changed at all since first edition published in 1988).
"A propaganda model has a certain initial plausibility on guided free-market assumptions that are not particularly controversial.
In essence, the private media are major corporations selling a product (readers and audiences) to other businesses (advertisers).
The national media typically target and serve elite opinion, groups that, on the one hand, provide an optimal “profile” for advertising purposes, and, on the other, play a role in decision-making in the private and public spheres.
The national media would be failing to meet their elite audience’s needs if they did not present a tolerably realistic portrayal of the world.
But their “societal purpose” also requires that the media’s interpretation of the world reflect the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers, and the governmental and private institutions dominated by these groups."
To provide a little bit more context, here is detailed description of this bug [0].
Curiously, they suggest that problem could be avoided by changing the check for EOF to ">=".
This is not true at all in case of C, at least as far as language semantics is concerned.
When pointer goes two past the end of array you are already in undefined behaviour land.
> The Ragel code we wrote contained a bug that caused the pointer to jump over the end of the buffer and past the ability of an equality check to spot the buffer overrun.
Sorry, I didn't make myself clear there. Under-specified security properties. Although they (and TLS, honestly) do a better job than others, in their protocol documentation they really don't go to any lengths to describe what actual security the protocol provides - just that it is "secure". This makes verifying these protocols nigh impossible - and usually you end up with the analyst having to reverse-engineer what security properties they think the designers wanted the protocol to ensure.
(n+1)sec attempts to address the issue of transcript consistency, which is completely out of scope for megolm.
Though, it puts additional requirements on the chart room, in particular "members of the chat room receive the same chat events in the same order".
I wonder how well this works in practice; does XMPP chat rooms usually ensure this or not; what about flaky internet connection, etc.
The protocol itself could implement an ITC, with deterministic rules for concurrent events, and thus have an identical ordering for all members. It would make sense to make this as an extra layer on top of the core protocol when using distribution mechanics that cannot guarantee ordering (which is most of them).
OMEMO ensures neither room consistency nor transcript consistency. In fact, last time I checked you could easily send different transcript to different participants (for example by simply not providing them decryption key or providing an incorrect one; some clients do not provide any feedback to the user that something is going wrong).
One of the more frustrating aspects of some clients like Gajim is that you can be in a multiparty chat, but there's no way to tell why OMEMO isn't working. You're probably missing somebody's keys, but unless you go spelunking through debug logs you're never going to know. And good luck if one of the members of the memberlist rarely signs in, then you'll never get his key thus rendering OMEMO useless!
What I think is even more frustrating is that OMEMO is not required by default. I try to communicate with a group of people without WhatsApp, but I'm not in a position to tell them each which options to check, and what to look for. That's too much hassle for them. That's why I think Jabber/XMPP is lost.
Encryption must be on by default. Better if there is no option of unencrypted communication at all. Go get a debug build for that.
Receiving receipts and reading receipts are a must. It must be on by default. Communication always goes two ways. I had enough situations where one couldn't be sure if the other person has read an urgent info and whether the situation needed escalation.
Account information must be hidden, if the system is not decentralized. People don't want to remember account names and passwords. Get device specific keys, or whatever. Just hide it from the user, unless they want to look at it. People don't want to hear about servers.
"In England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes of people, the property of landed proprietors would be insecure. An agrarian law would soon take place. If these observations be just, our government ought to secure the permanent interests of the country against innovation. Landholders ought to have a share in the government, to support these invaluable interests, and to balance and check the other. They ought to be so constituted as to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority." -- James Madison
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experience_machine