Tibetan history, like Chinese history, is complicated.
On the subject of Tibetan assimilation: what most people think of Tibet - that is the current Tibetan autonomous region of the PRC - is actually only about 1/3 of what many Tibetans would call "Tibet."
What is culturally and ethnically Tibetan actually stretches across Qinghai province, as well as large swaths of Sichuan, and part of Yunnan and Gansu. If you go to these regions and talk to Tibetans, they will tell you you are in Amdo, Kham, etc, even though you may be in the administrative province of, for example, Sichuan. Residents will still sometimes even use these designations on their postal envelopes.
There are some historical reasons for the way Tibet is currently defined, but "Tibet" was also chopped up into a much smaller contemporary "tibet" for, er, strategic reasons.
If you are interested in the big 3 Tibetan regions:
Regional designations are complicated, but there is nothing complicated about passing judgment over the atrocities being perpetrated today by the CCP.
I'm simply glad that there's finally cohesion by many leaders across the world in urging that Beijing be completely stripped of the prestige of hosting the upcoming Winter Olympics.
The point is these areas are still pretty actively Tibetan today, not just historically.
Is there a contiguous region stretching from Mongolia deep into the Middle East and to Europe where a high percentage of the population (like a quarter or more) speaks Mongolian as their native language?
I know that might be true for a small area surrounding Mongolia in Russia, but I think the comparison stretching into the Middle East and Europe is not accurate.
Qinghai is still almost a quarter Tibetan (a percentage that has probably been consistently shrinking in recent history due to migration) and is almost as large, area-wise, as the formal Tibetan autonomous region.
The dedicated Turanist will talk your ear off about linguistic co-evolution, haplogroups, and so on, but no, of course not. The example was deliberately outlandish. A quarter is lower than the proportion of Russians in Crimea.
I think we may ultimately be making the same point, that political borders are by nature artificial and often fail to reflect the historical fluidity of culture and ethnicity, but I objected to the perceived implication that these regions are uniquely Tibetan.
I've hiked through regions of Tibet and talked to villagers in relatively remote areas. One thing I saw hiking in the mountains and valleys was abandoned nomad lodges and pastures. My Tibetan guide sadly explained to me that the local officials found the nomads too hard to manage when they were living independently and so used a system of sticks and carrots (fines and subsidies) to move them into villages that were created from scratch and comprised of cookie-cutter cement houses.
One effective incentive to get the nomads to settle down is to threaten their family members with fines or removal of subsidies unless they move into town.
I visited some of those made-ex-nihilo villages and talked to the people there. One immediately obvious thing is there are Chinese national flags flying on almost every single household and big posters of Xi in the households. I asked about those and the residents explained they get fined if they don't fly the flag or hang Xi's photo. They were definitely not acting out of patriotism. The scenes reminded me of a wartime occupation.
Military recruitment posters were also plastered everywhere, as it is a form of employment in a region with relatively few alternatives.
This is the first time I've heard of migration ratios as bureaucratic targets, but it's not surprising at all as it is typical for the government to set clear KPIs for their policies.
This is a great point. An additional aspect to this is developers - while living in China, I spoke with a number of officials who essentially admitted that a major aspect of "relocation" was driven by developers who purchased land from the local governments and then were lent money by the local government. When those buildings weren't filled, and with the pressure to pay back loans mounting, the developers and local officials would conspire to force people from outlying regions to relocate in the town developments. The developers would then receive central/local $$ for "helping" low income citizens "move up." And then the cycle would repeat. This leaves out other aspects - but it certainly plays a role.
What you are saying is definitely true in a general sense; a lot of local gov income comprises of shady land deals. However it is a bit different in 'far border' areas such as Tibet/Xinjiang. Land is not scarce, and development not so attractive. Also as some one grew up in China I would take a pinch of salt on what the 'officials' are admitting. There won't be anything meaningful if you haven't got a real tie with them. Besides after Xi became president, calling out corrupted officials is a such massive effort and that's why Xi (or more precisely the group he may represent) has so many enemies even in the party.
My wife is from Sichuan which is bordering Tibet. It is a bit more complicated than that. Over the years the development has been fast but still far behind the majority of China. The polices to 'encourage' and harness the great overall economic growth were uniquely shaped and had an element of 'outdated' fashion (or USSR style if that's your opinion). And the flags and posters you saw is probably a chicken and egg problem: the gov sees misinformation (or propaganda from west depends on your view) and wants more territorial control (against the largely available chinese language free Tibet tabloids) and people who actually wants to use it as a way to get more support from the gov. It was nothing like that a decade ago, the social media amplification definitely accelerated that as well.
I am partially sympathetic to the idea that this can be a way for people to lead better lives - in the modern, economic sense - instead of subsistence nomading.
At the same time, China has, over the past several years, also demonstrated a trend of new behavior and a clear break away from a previous trend of liberalization that started with Deng. This push in Tibet should be seen in light of what is going on in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Inner Mongolia, and at the Indian border.
I want to agree with you but I too am a bit out of touch (all the information is from friends). I don't like to defend the central gov but there is too much smoke and mirror to see through things. A lot of press reports genuine issues about China but also a mix of unverifiable information. I believe the local governance is actually improving. At central level it might be a very different story. However that said sometimes it is hard to judge. Did it really depart from Deng's approach? Was Deng's method deserving applause? My parents generation (the equivalent of boomers) suffered most throughout their youth and it is only getting better now. So for any long term impact, I'm not sure myself.
There is of course a variety of opinions across any demographic.
My impression is that, aside from people who've studied abroad, Chinese youth today are more conservative and nationalistic than their elders. They've been fed only on a diet of domestic media with external news censored and have grown up only seeing their standards of living rapidly improving with China taking a more central role on the world stage.
The older generations, who suffered through the Cultural Revolution and then saw it end, and those who grew up during Deng's period are more likely to be liberal and sympathetic to the West. Even Jiang Zemin spoke English and liked Western opera.
But I think if you ask people of about any demographic, they will tell you Xi has changed the trajectory that China was previously on. The end of 10-year term limits demonstrated an objective shift towards one-man rule instead of an oligarchy where power was more diffused between elite factions.
I agree with you. However Xi is only one person, there is much larger power structure behind him. And you are absolutely right, Jiang and Deng have much more experience with the west and 'modern' at their times. As for the younger generation I couldn't really blame them; the ones who are interested in the outside world already did so. I believe there are substantial proportions of youth who have a balanced world-view. But given the education structure and absolute large population base you won't see them represented. I couldn't give much credit for chinese students abroad, since large part of them are quite privileged and ignorant(depends on how they were brought up), the rest were the poorer, sponsored students, they would naturally be very nationalistic.
In such an environment, anecdotes may be among the most accurate information one can get.
I've never really seen such personally. People occasionally petition the central government due to grievances, but those people are heavily monitored, strongly discouraged, and later suffer negative repercussions (I know one such individual personally).
There are occasionally protests regarding local issues: housing demolition, environmental problems. They are not allowed to persist. I've never seen these in person.
I used to very occasionally see graffiti critical of the government, but I don't think I've see such in 5+ years. I figure the omnipresence of the security cameras have discouraged this.
I once received a robocall from the Falun Gong critiquing the government. I also occasionally see Falun Gong messages stamped on paper currency.
That's about it. I'm curious about the specifics of the case(s) about which you've heard.
You are likely underestimating the staying power of ByteDance. They have a portfolio of successful apps within China, such as Toutiao, and have probably overtaken Baidu to be the 3rd most important software company in China (after Alibaba and Tencent). Unlike Vine or Snap, they have a lot of e-commerce revenue and are a major sales platform.
Should they be allowed to continue expanding internationally, something like a Facebook or Amazon peer would be the more relevant comparison.
> Chinese policy seems to have not significantly changed in the last 5 years towards the US
Chinese policy "towards the US" may be too narrow a view.
Within the past 5 years, Xi Jinping has eliminated the scheduled 10-year leadership transition which served to alternate power between various elite factions in China. This has put him in a position to maintain leadership for life. After Xi achieved this, China has seen numerous significant domestic and foreign policy shifts.
As China has become more of a near-peer global power with the US, Chinese domestic politics have become more relevant to everyone.
China's legislature amended Hong Kong's constitution to add the new national security law precisely because the Hong Kong legislature - even under heavy influence by mainland China - was unable to pass it.
This is because Article 18 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong allows China to promulgate certain laws related to national security. Taiwan doesn't have this.
> The Basic Law says Chinese laws can't be applied in Hong Kong unless they are listed in a section called Annex III - there are already a few listed there, mostly uncontroversial and around foreign policy.
These laws can be introduced by decree - which means they bypass the city's parliament. Critics say the introduction of the law this way amounts to a breach of the "one country, two systems" principle, which is so important to Hong Kong - but clearly it is technically possible to do this.
Your base case scenario should be that this will be globally widespread. The tipping point was when Iran became an epicenter. This is problematic because of its porous borders with countries with weak government.
The good news is the virus is not too risky for an individual, excepting those who are old and with pre-existing conditions. The bad news is that there will likely be a lot of deaths in aggregate, globally. The other bad news is that the virus has been highly disruptive socially and economically in every country when the infection rate has started to climb.
The best we can do is calmly make preparations for how things will change.
The biggest impact will be on global supply chains. Also paints into sharp contrast our over reliance on China.
A side project I'm working on uses a key component from a Chinese manufacturer. Their factory has been shut indefinitely and we are 40 days behind schedule. My rep told me that while they've been working on the marketing/tech side of things from home, the factory can't open since workers are simply refusing to show up, and neither coercion or incentives seem to help.
People are eventually going to realize that the economic costs of this reaction far exceeds the cost of letting it spread, and things will slowly return to normal.
The only real uncertainty at this point is if the HN/reddit fever-dream scenario of overwhelmed hospitals plays out, outside of Wuhan.
I think many people here on hackernews are being stupid that they are healthy adults so they don't need to worry. Even if you don't die you will be out of the work force for 2-3 weeks either because you are sick or quarantined. You could pass the infection to your children, parents Grand parents who might not be able to fight off the infection and die. Many people get flu vaccines or over the years have built up some immunity. This virus is new so no one has any immunity most people will get infected only some might die but the many that get sick will be out of the work force. You guys are aware of tech productions shortages but a lot of other goods like garments we wear come from China. If they are unable to start back up soon world will be facing shortages of many other items prices will start going up soon. Other countries have started hitting capacity production for garments as China is out and they still can't meet the demand.
Not to mention the virus is mutating and is now killing healthy people in their twenties in Hubei (if not at least serious disease requiring mechanical ventilation and supplemental oxygen). Also there is evidence the HIV drugs are no longer working due to the virus developing resistance.
Those of you thinking "oh I'm a healthy young person I'm just gonna carry on doing what I'm doing" is gonna be in for a rude awakening.
My understanding was that this virus has a molecular proofreading system that reduces its mutation rate, and makes it unlikely to develop a more deadly strain - was this dispelled in any way?
Maybe I'm just looking for comfort, but this passage (from your first link) seems like a big logical leap to me:
> The fact that patients not displaying symptoms are able to transmit the coronavirus indicates something alarming. As typically such respiratory viruses are normally transmitted thru the mouth via coughing in which minute droplets are exposed or thru the nose when the nasal fluids are released through sneezing or blowing of the nose.
> If a person is not showing any symptoms, then the only possible means is through the exhaled air of the infected individual, which implies that the virus is an extremely potent airborne pathogen.
People who aren't sick still cough/sneeze/blow their nose sometimes. (Especially so in the case of people with allergies, but everyone does it a bit.)
And surely people could transmit the disease through saliva (or other fluids) spread via their hands. People touch their face, pick their teeth, eat with their hands, pick their nose, bite their nails, etc. etc.
Then there is the possibility of transmission through shared meals, or even inadequately washed cutlery etc.
Don't get me wrong, asymptomatic spread is scary, and it probably provides some evidence in favour of airborne transmission. But I don't see how they can make such an absolute statement, when there seem to be other available explanations.
Interesting article, but what point are you making by posting it without comment? It doesn't confirm airborne transmission, unless that is implied by background knowledge I'm missing (?). And it certainly doesn't tell me anything about the logic of the passage I quoted, so I remain sceptical about that other article's quality.
How do you expect asymptomatic infected individuals to spread the virus? The viral load is highest in the nose, suggesting that they can infect others by simply breathing in their vicinity. This is different from droplet transmission when people are coughing/sneezing.
> This is different from droplet transmission when people are coughing/sneezing.
I know, and I thought that was what we were discussing: how strong is the evidence for airborne transmission.
> How do you expect asymptomatic infected individuals to spread the virus?
I gave a bunch of possibilities in my previous reply.
> The viral load is highest in the nose
Higher in the nose than the throat, according to the Medpagetoday article, but that doesn't imply it is absent from the throat -- rather the opposite, otherwise they would have phrased it differently. And people do pick and blow their noses, and sneeze occasionally even when healthy, so it's not like breathing is the only possible route out of the nose. Not to mention the connectedness of nose and throat, which makes it hard for me to imagine a virus being present in the nose but reliably absent from saliva.
I'm not arguing that airborne transmission is unlikely -- I don't know, and am trying to form an opinion. Which is why I'm questioning the argument that it is definitely happening, and responsible for all asymptomatic contagion: it seems overstated to me, but if I'm missing key background facts, I'd like to learn them.
With the spread specially being high in enclosed spaces like the churches in Korea, Singapore and the cruise ship in Japan. I do think either it is airborne or the virus can live outside the human body longer compared to other flu viruses. Most of the high spread patterns outside china where we have information is in enclosed spaces like churches or the cruise ship.
I can comment on a couple unexpected shortages we've seen in Asia: toilet paper, due to panic buying, and hand sanitizer.
There are also some concerns about medicines unrelated to the virus because many meds are produced in China and the supply chain here is all screwed up. So some might consider getting medicine refills for 30 days (or however long your insurance will let you) in advance. You also might not want to have to go wait in line at a pharmacy during a pandemic.
In terms of work: it may make sense to start thinking about what kind of work can be done efficiently remotely vs. on-site.
You also may want to think about finances in case the world sees a significant economic contraction. If lots of countries replicate what has happened in China, the world economy will be highly disrupted for at least a couple months.
Super useful comment. R.e. toilet paper, random observation: buy a bidet and you basically won't need to buy tp very much any more. They are very inexpensive at least in the states. You can get one for $20 or so.
Yep, we have a backup supply. That said if there's no running water for a prolonged period we are eventually going to start having other problems. Fwiw I don't think that is an anticipated outcome even of a global covid-19 pandemic.
That is a possible explanation, but not necessarily the most likely explanation.
It's also quite plausible the Hubei numbers are being scrutinized and processed differently (perhaps with input or oversight from the central government) whereas the other provinces are relying more on local provincial officials' reporting. There is a high incentive for these officials to avoid reporting negative news, so a bias towards low numbers would not be surprising.
We should rely more on international numbers instead of Chinese ones and particularly look askew at the China ex-Hubei numbers.
On the subject of Tibetan assimilation: what most people think of Tibet - that is the current Tibetan autonomous region of the PRC - is actually only about 1/3 of what many Tibetans would call "Tibet."
What is culturally and ethnically Tibetan actually stretches across Qinghai province, as well as large swaths of Sichuan, and part of Yunnan and Gansu. If you go to these regions and talk to Tibetans, they will tell you you are in Amdo, Kham, etc, even though you may be in the administrative province of, for example, Sichuan. Residents will still sometimes even use these designations on their postal envelopes.
There are some historical reasons for the way Tibet is currently defined, but "Tibet" was also chopped up into a much smaller contemporary "tibet" for, er, strategic reasons.
If you are interested in the big 3 Tibetan regions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amdo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kham
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9C-Tsang